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Abstract—We investigate beamforming and artificial noise
generation at the secondary transmitters to establish secure
transmission in large scale spectrum sharing networks, where
multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the
secondary transmission. We develop a comprehensive analytical
framework to accurately assess the secrecy performance under
the primary user’s quality of service constraint. Our aim is
to characterize the impact of beamforming and artificial noise
generation on this complex large scale network. We first derive
the exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and the secrecy
outage probability. Our results show that there exists an average
secrecy rate wall beyond which the primary user’s quality of
service is violated. Interestingly, we find that different from
the conventional network with fixed nodes where equal power
allocation achieves near optimal average secrecy rate, the equal
power allocation may not be a good option for large scale
spectrum sharing networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sky-rocketing growth of multimedia infotainment appli-
cations and broadband-hungry mobile devices (smart-phone,
tablets, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication devices)
exacerbate the stringent demand for high data rate and da-
ta service. To cope with this, the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) approved to allow the unlicensed users to
transmit on the spectrum reserved for the wireless broadband
devices as long as the quality of service (QoS) of the primary
network is satisfied [1–3]. This is the so-called cognitive radio
networks (CRNs).
Due to the open and dynamic characteristics of cognitive
wireless channels, new classes of security threats and chal-
lenges are introduced into CRNs (opportunistic utilization of
licensed channels). In this paper, we focus on the eavesdrop-
ping attacks targeted at the secondary users (SUs), where the
eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the transmission between
the secondary transceivers [4]. In this case, the eavesdroppers
always keep silent without transmitting any signals, and can
hardly be detected by the SUs.
Recently, beamforming and artificial noise generation
(BF&AN) at the legitimate transmitter has been proposed
as a promising technique to confuse the eavesdroppers and
enhance the security [5, 6]. In this paper, we study the se-
crecy performance of large scale underlay spectrum sharing
networks with BF&AN at the SU transmitter. Stochastic
geometry and random geometric graphs are used to model the
proposed network [7, 8]. Equipping the SU transmitter with
multiple antennas capable of transmitting information signal
and artificial noise (AN) simultaneously brings array gains
at the legitimate receiver and disrupts the reception at the
eavesdropper. This will boost the signal-to-interference ratio
(SIR) at the SU receiver while impair the received signals
at the eavesdroppers. We concentrate on characterizing the
impact of several key system parameters such as the power
allocation factor, the number of antennas at the SU transmitter,
the densities of PUs, SUs, and eavesdroppers on the secrecy
performance. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We quantify the permissive transmit power region where
the primary network’s QoS can be guaranteed, as pre-
sented in Theorem 1. It is shown that from the PU
receiver’s perspective, the permissive transmit power
region fluctuates significantly for different densities of
SUs and PUs.
2) We derive the exact expressions for the average secrecy
rate and the secrecy outage probability of the secondary
network with BF&AN at the SU transmitters, as present-
ed in Theorems 2 and 3. It is shown that there exists an
average secrecy rate wall beyond which the PU receiv-
er’s QoS is violated. It is revealed that the optimal power
allocation factor which achieves the maximum average
secrecy rate varies for different system parameters, and
the equal power allocation may not achieve near optimal
average secrecy rate.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider the secure communication in an underlay spec-
trum sharing network where the SU transmitters communicate
with the corresponding SU receivers under the potential ma-
licious attempt of multiple eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 1.
Each SU transmitter has Ns antennas, and others in this model
are all single-antenna nodes. We have a set of PU transmitters,
SU transmitters, and eavesdroppers locations, denoted by Φp,
Φs and Φe, in which Φp, Φs and Φe follow independent
homogeneous Poisson point processes (HPPPs) with densities
λp, λs and λe, respectively. This model is practical and
representative for the decentralized networks where each node
has substantial mobility or networks deployed randomly [9].
Following the bipolar network model [10, 11], we assume
that each PU/SU transmitter communicates with its unique
associated intended PU/SU receiver at distances rp and rs,
respectively.
PU-Tx  
PU-Rx  
SU-Tx  
SU-Rx  
Eve  
Fig. 1. A realization of a large scale spectrum sharing network model
describing the received signal at a SU receiver. In this network, the green
square represents the PU transmitter, the diamond represents the PU receiver,
the triangle represents the SU transmitter, the circle represents the SU
receiver, and the red star represents the eavesdropper. The blue solid line
represents the secondary transmission, the green solid line represents the
primary transmission, the blue dashed line represents the interference from
the SU transmitter, and the green dashed line presents the interference from
the PU transmitter.
The wireless channels are modeled as independent quasi-
static Rayleigh fading. The eavesdroppers interpret the sec-
ondary transmitter’s signal without trying to modify it. In
this complex CRNs, we consider the interference-limited case
where the thermal noise is negligible compared with the
aggregate interference from other transmitters. Similar as [12,
13], we utilize the SIR to characterize the performance.
We mask the beamformed broadcast information with the
AN at the SU transmitters to confuse the eavesdroppers.
Each SU transmitter broadcasts the information-bearing sig-
nals and artificial noise simultaneously. The AN is transmitted
in the null space of the intended SU receiver’s channel,
thus imposing no effect on the secondary channel, whereas
degrading the eavesdropper’s channel. We denote the intended
channel vector between the ith SU transmitter (i ∈ Φs) and the
corresponding SU receiver as hi,si ∈ C
1×Ns , the channel state
information (CSI) of which is known at the ith SU transmitter.
An orthonormal basis of CNs×Ns is generated at the ith SU
transmitter as
[
h
†
i,si
/
‖hi,si‖, Gi,si
]
Ns×Ns
1, where Gi,si is
a Ns × (Ns − 1) matrix. Note that each column of Gi,si and
h
†
i,si
/
‖hi,si‖ are mutually orthogonal. We define bi as the
information-bearing signal, and nA as the artificial noise. The
transmitted beamforming and AN symbol vector is modelled
as
xsi =
h
†
i,si
‖hi,si‖
bi +Gi,sinA, (1)
1† is the conjugate transpose operator.
where E
{
bib
†
i
}
= δ2s , and Ns − 1 elements of nA are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance σ2n. Thus,
the total transmit power per transmission Ps is given by
Ps = PI + PA, where the power allocated to the information
signal is PI = σ
2
s and the power allocated to the AN is
PA = (Ns − 1)σ
2
n. We also define µ as the fraction of power
assigned to the information signal, thus, PI = µPs .
In the primary network, we consider an arbitrary pair of
PU transceiver, referred to as the typical PU transmitter and
receiver. We assume the typical PU receiver is located at the
origin of the coordinate system, and the distance between the
PU transmitter and its associated PU receiver is rp. According
to the Slivnyak’s theorem [14], adding a probe point to the
HPPP at an arbitrary location does not affect the law of the
point process. For each PU receiver, the information-bearing
signal and AN generated by the secondary transmitter are
regarded as interference, thus the received SIR at the typical
PU receiver is given by
γ
p,AN
SIR
=
|hp0 |
2
rp
−α
Ip,p0 + P
−1
p Is,p0
, (2)
where Ip,p0 =
∑
j∈Φp\{0}
|hj,p0 |
2
|Xj,p0 |
−α
, Is,p0 =∑
i∈Φs
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,p0 h
†
i,si∥
∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,p0Gi,si∥∥2
]∣∣Xi,p0 ∣∣−α. In
(2), α is the path-loss exponent, hp0 is the channel fading
gain between the typical PU transmitter and the typical PU
receiver, hj,p0 and |Xj,p0 | are the interfering channel fading
gain and distance between the jth PU transmitter and the
typical PU receiver, respectively, hi,p0 ∈ C
1×Ns and |Xi,p0 |
are the interfering channel vector and distance between the
ith SU transmitter and the typical PU receiver, respectively,
and Pp is the transmit power at the PU transmitter.
In the secondary network, we shift the coordinate system
to put the typical SU receiver at the origin, and assume
h0,s0 ∈ C
1×Ns and rs to be the channel vector and distance
between the typical SU transmitter and corresponding typical
SU receiver. Note that each SU transmitter transmits the
signal vector expressed as (1), we obtain the effective signal
at the typical SU receiver as h0,s0xs0 = h0,s0
h
†
0,s0
‖h0,s0‖
b0 +
h0,s0G0,s0nA = ‖h0,s0‖b0. Due to the concurrent transmis-
sion in the underlay spectrum sharing network, the typical SU
receiver is subject to the aggregate interference from the PU
transmitters and other SU transmitters, thus, the received SIR
at the typical SU receiver is given by
γ
s,AN
SIR
=
σ2s‖h0,s0‖
2
rs
−α
Is,s0 + PpIp,s0
, (3)
where Ip,s0 =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,s0 |
2
|Xj,s0 |
−α
, Is,s0 =∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,s0 h
†
i,si∥
∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,s0Gi,si∥∥2
]∣∣Xi,s0 ∣∣−α.
In (3), hj,s0 and |Xj,s0 | are the channel fading gain and
distance between the jth PU transmitter and the typical SU
receiver, respectively, hi,s0 ∈ C
1×Ns and |Xi,s0 | are the
interfering channel vector and distance between the ith SU
transmitter and the typical SU receiver, respectively.
In the eavesdropping channel, we consider the most detri-
mental eavesdropper that has the highest SIR for a typical SU
transmitter [15]. Note that eavesdroppers are only interested
in the secondary transmissions, and interpret the primary
transmissions as interference. This assumption is practical
since the primary networks operate in the Digital Video Broad-
casting (DVB) spectrum and broadcast the public service to
households, which do not have any confidential messages. We
assume h0,ek ∈ C
1×Ns to be the channel vector between the
typical SU transmitter and an arbitrary eavesdropper ek ∈ Φe.
As such, the SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper is
expressed as
γ
e,AN
SIR
= max
ek∈Φe
{
γ
ek,AN
SIR
}
, (4)
where
γ
ek,AN
SIR
=
σ2s
∣∣h0,ek h
†
0,s0
‖h†0,s0‖
∣∣2|Xek |−α
Is,ek + PpIp,ek + σ
2
nIs0,ek,an
. (5)
In (5), Ip,ek =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,ek |
2
|Xj,ek |
−α
, Is,ek =∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,ek h
†
i,si∥
∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,ekGi,si∥∥2
]
|Xi,ek |
−α
,
Is0,ek,an = ‖h0,ekG0,s0‖
2
|Xek |
−α
. Note that hj,ek and
|Xj,ek | are the channel fading gain and distance between the
jth PU transmitter and the kth eavesdropper, respectively,
hi,ek ∈ C
1×Ns and |Xi,ek | are the channel vector and distance
between the ith SU transmitter and the kth eavesdropper,
respectively, |Xek | is the distance between the typical SU
transmitter and the kth eavesdropper.
To facilitate the performance analysis, we first present the
Laplace transform of the aggregate interference from SU
transmitters Is,z =
∑
i∈Φs
Wsi,z|Xi,z|
−α
in (2), (3), and (4)
as the following lemma, where z ∈ {p0, d0,ek}. Here, we
define Wsi,z = σ
2
s
∣∣hi,z h†i,si∥∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,zGi,si∥∥2, where
hi,si is the intended channel, and the BF&AN signal xsi in
(1) transmitted by the ith SU transmitter is received by the
non-intended receiver z, rather than the ith SU receiver.
Lemma 1. The Laplace transform of the interference from the
SU transmitters with BF&AN to the non-intended receiver Is,z
is derived as
LIs,z (s) =


exp
(
−λspiP
2
α
s Υ1Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
s
2
α
)
µ 6= 1
Ns
exp
(
−λspi(µPs)
2
αΓ
(
Ns +
2
α
) Γ(1− 2α )
Γ(Ns)
s
2
α
)
µ = 1
Ns
,
(6)
where
Υ1 =
(
1−
(1− µ)
(Ns − 1)µ
)1−Ns[
µ
2
αΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
−
1
µ
( (1− µ)
Ns − 1
)1+ 2α Ns−2∑
k=0
(
1−
(1− µ)
(Ns − 1)µ
)kΓ (k + 1 + 2
α
)
Γ (k + 1)
]
.
(7)
Due to the limited space, detailed derivation is not included.
III. EXACT SECRECY PERFROMANCE
In this section, we first present the SU’s permissive transmit
power region, and then examine key secrecy performance,
namely the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage prob-
ability, in large scale spectrum sharing network with BF&AN
at the SU transmitters.
A. Beamforming and Artificial Noise Generation
1) PUs’ Quality of Service Requirement: According to the
rule of underlay spectrum sharing networks, the concurrent
transmission of PUs and SUs occurs under the prerequisite that
the QoS requirement of the primary transmission is satisfied.
The QoS of primary network is characterized that the outage
probability should be no larger than the peak allowable value
ρ
p
out, which is expressed as
P
{p}
out = Pr
{
γ
p,AN
SIR
< γ
{p}
th
}
< ρ
{p}
out , (8)
where γ
{p}
th is the desired SIR threshold at the PU receiver.
In the following theorem, we present the SU’s permissive
transmit power region.
Theorem 1. With BF&AN at the SU transmitter, the permis-
sive transmit power region at the SU transmitter is given as
Ps ∈ (0, P
max
s ], where
Pmaxs =


(
− ΘΥ1λs
)α
2
Pp µ 6=
1
Ns(
− ΘΓ(Ns)
λsΓ(Ns+ 2α )
)α
2 Pp
µ
µ = 1
Ns
,
(9)
Υ1 is given by (7), and
Θ =
ln
(
1− ρ
{p}
out
))
piΓ
(
1− 2
α
) (
γ
{p}
th
) 2
α
rp2
+ λpΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
. (10)
2) New Statistics: In order to examine the secrecy perfor-
mance, we derive the CDFs of SIRs at the typical SU receiver
and the most detrimental eavesdropper in the following Lem-
ma 2 and Lemma 3, respectively.
Lemma 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the CDF of
SIR at the typical SU receiver is derived as
F
{s}
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
γ
{s}
th
)
= 1− exp
(
−Λl
(
γ
{s}
th
) 2
α
r2s
)
−
Ns−1∑
m=1
(rαs )
m
m!(−1)
m
∑ m!
m∏
i=1
mi!i!mi
exp
(
−Λl
(
γ
{s}
th
) 2
α
r2s
)
(11)
m∏
j=1
((
−Λl
(
γ
{s}
th
) 2
α
)
(rs)
2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k
))mj
,
where
Λl =
{
Λ2 µ =
1
Ns
Λ3 µ 6=
1
Ns
.
(12)
In (12), Λ2 and Λ3 are given by
Λ2 =pi
(
λs
Γ
(
Ns +
2
α
)
Γ
(
Ns
) + λpΓ(1 + 2
α
)(
µ
Ps
Pp
)− 2α)
Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
,
(13)
Λ3 = pi
(
λpΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)(Ps
Pp
)− 2
α + λsΥ1
)
Γ
(
1−
2
α
)
(µ)
− 2
α ,
(14)
respectively. Here,
m∑
i=1
i ·mi = m, and Υ1 is given by (7),
and Ps is the maximum permissive transmit power, which is
given in (9).
Based on the SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper in
(4), we derive the CDF for γ
e,AN
SIR
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the CDF of
SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper is derived as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
=
exp
(
−
piλe
Λl
(
γ
{e}
th
)− 2
α
( 1− µ(
Ns − 1
)
µ
γ
{e}
th + 1
)1−Ns)
,
(15)
where Λl is given in (12). Note that Ps is the maximum
permissive transmit power, which is given in (9).
We observe from (15) that the CDF of γ
e,AN
SIR
is an increas-
ing function of λs and λp, and a decreasing function of λe.
3) Average Secrecy Rate: The instantaneous secrecy rate is
defined as [15]
Cse = [Csu − CE]
+. (16)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}, Csu = log2
(
1 + γs,AN
SIR
)
is the ca-
pacity of a typical secondary link, and CE = log2
(
1+γe,AN
SIR
)
is the capacity of the eavesdropping channel between the
typical SU transmitter and the most detrimental eavesdropper.
Here, γ
e,AN
SIR
= max
ek∈Φe
{
γ
ek,AN
SIR
}
corresponds to the non-
colluding eavesdropping case [16].
The average secrecy rate is the average of the instantaneous
secrecy rate Cse over γ
s,AN
SIR
and γ
e,AN
SIR
. As such, the average
secrecy rate is given by [17]
C¯se =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Csefγs,AN
SIR
(x1) fγe,AN
SIR
(x2)dx1dx2
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
F
γ
e,AN
SIR
(x2)
1 + x2
(
1− F
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
x2
))
dx2. (17)
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Fig. 2. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network with
the transmit power adaptation scheme. Parameters: λe = λp = λs = 10
−4,
α = 3, rp = 6, rs = 3, Pp = 15 dB, and γ
{p}
th
= 6 dB.
By substituting the CDF of γ
s,AN
SIR
in (11) and the CDF of
γ
e,AN
SIR
in (15) into (17), we derive the average secrecy rate in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the average
secrecy rate is derived as
C¯se,AN =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
exp(−piλeΛl x2
− 2
α ( 1−µ(Ns−1)µx2 + 1)
1−Ns
)
1 + x2
exp
(
−Λlx2
2
α r2s
)[
1 +
Ns−1∑
m=1
(rαs )
m
m!
(
−1
)m ∑m!
m∏
j=1
((−Λlx2
2
α )(rs)
2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k))
mj
mj !j!mj
]
dx2,
(18)
where Λl is given in (12). Here, Ps is the maximum permissive
transmit power, which is given in (9).
4) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage is de-
clared when the secrecy capacity Cse is less than the expected
secrecy rate Rs. As such, the secrecy outage probability is
defined as [17]
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cse < Rs)
=
∫ ∞
0
f
γ
e,AN
SIR
(x2)Fγs,AN
SIR
(
2Rs (1+x2)− 1
)
dx2. (19)
By substituting the probability density function (PDF) of
γ
e,AN
SIR
and CDF of γ
s,AN
SIR
into (19), we derive the secrecy
outage probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the secrecy
  
-20 30-30 -10 0 10 20
P     (dB) 
s               
0
5
10
15
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 S
e
c
re
c
y
 R
a
te
 (
b
it
s/
s/
H
z
)
Ex.  , 
 
 
 
 
 
10
−5
 =sλ 10
−4
 =pλ
Ex.  , 10
−4
 =sλ 10
−4
 =pλ
Ex. , 10
−4
 =sλ 10
−5
 =pλ
Ex. , 10
−3
 =sλ 10
−4
 =pλ
Ex. , 10
−4
 =sλ 10
−5
  = 5*pλ
Fig. 3. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network with
the transmit power adaptation scheme. Parameters: λe = 10
−4, Ns = 6,
α = 3, rp = 6, rs = 3, µ = 0.4, Pp = 15 dB, and γ
{p}
th
= 6 dB.
outage probability is derived as
Pout,AN (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
piλex2
− 2
α
(
2
α
x2
−1
(
1−µ
(Ns−1)µ
x2 + 1
)
+ 1
)
Λl
(
1−µ
(Ns−1)µ
x2 + 1
)Ns
exp
(
−
piλe
Λl
x2
− 2
α
( 1− µ
(Ns − 1)µ
x2 + 1
)1−Ns)[
1−
exp
(
−Λ3
(
2Rs
(
1+x2
)
− 1
) 2
α r2s
)(
1 +
Ns−1∑
m=1
(
rαs
)m
m!
(
−1
)m ∑m!
m∏
j=1
((−Λl(2
Rs(1+x2)− 1)
2
α )(rs)
2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k))
mj
mj !j!mj
)]
dx2,
(20)
where Λl is given in (12). Here, Ps is the maximum permissive
transmit power, which is given in (9).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 plot the average secrecy rate of large
scale underlay spectrum sharing network under the primary
network’s QoS constraint ρ
{p}
out = 0.1 with the transmit power
adaptation scheme. From the figures, we see that the exact an-
alytical curves are well validated by Monte Carlo simulations.
The solid lines represent the operational achievable average
secrecy rate where the primary’s QoS constraint is always
satisfied, i.e. P
pri,AN
out
(
γ
{p}
th
)
≤ 0.1. The dashed lines represent
the unachievable average secrecy rate where the primary net-
work’s QoS constraint is violated, i.e. P
pri,AN
out
(
γ
{p}
th
)
> 0.1.
We named the solid line as the “average secrecy rate wall”. The
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network.
Parameters: λp = 10
−4, λs = 10
−3, α = 3, rp = 6, rs = 3, Ns = 6,
Pp = 15 dB, and γ
{p}
th
= 0 dB.
vertical line of this “average secrecy rate wall” is determined
by the maximum permissive transmit power at the SU Pmaxs ,
which is quantified and evaluated by using (9).
Fig. 2 plots the average secrecy rate versus the SU’s transmit
power with various numbers of transmit antennas Ns at the
SU and power allocation factor µ, and we consider the same
density for PUs, SUs, and eavesdroppers. The exact analytical
curves are obtained from (18). Several observations can be
concluded as follows: 1) The width of the “average secrecy
rate wall” is weakly dependent on the number of transmit
antennas at the SU and the power allocation factor, which can
be explained by (9); 2) For the fixed power allocation factor
µ = 0.4, the average secrecy rate increases with increasingNs;
3) For the same Ns, the average secrecy rate improves with
increasing µ, which shows more power should be allocated to
the information signal in this scenario.
Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy rate versus Ps for various
densities of PUs and SUs. We observe that 1) the “average
secrecy rate wall” will be pushed to the left as the PUs and
SUs become more dense. This can be predicted from (9) that
Pmaxs is a decreasing function of λp and λs; 2) With the
identical density of PUs, we see that the average secrecy
rate decreases with increasing the density of SUs. This is
because the aggregate interference from other SUs increases
with increasing λs, which restricts the secrecy performance of
the typical SU; 3) Given the fixed density of SUs, the average
secrecy rate decreases with increasing λp due to the increased
aggregate interference from PUs.
Fig. 4 plots the average secrecy rate versus the power
allocation factor µ for various densities of eavesdropper λe.
Here, we use the maximum permissive transmit power to
transmit the signal at SU, which is given by (18), and we
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus µ for variousNs and α. Parameters:
ρ
{p}
out = 0.1, λe = 10
−4, λp = 10
−4, λs = 10
−3, α = 3, rp = 6, rs = 3,
NS = 6, Rs = 1, Pp = 15 dB, and γ
{p}
th
= 0 dB.
set Ps = P
max
s and ρ
{p}
out = 0.1. The triangles represent
the maximum achievable average secrecy rate. Interestingly,
we find that in Fig. 4 the optimal power allocation factor
µ∗ varies for different λe. It is revealed that less power
should be allocated to the AN for the network with less
dense eavesdroppers. More importantly, when λe = 10
−3, the
optimal µ for achieving the maximum average secrecy rate is
close to 1. It is shown that the equal power allocation strategy
µ = 0.5 may not achieve near optimal average secrecy rate.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy outage probability versus the power
allocation factor µ for various numbers of antennas at SU
transmitter Ns. The exact analytical curves are obtained from
(20), which are well validated by Monte Carlo simulations.
We assume Ps = P
max
s . We see that the secrecy outage
probability decreases with increasing µ. When µ approaches
1, the lowest secrecy outage probability can be achieved.
This is because when we set the density of eavesdroppers
to be small compared with the density of SU, the effect of
delivering information overtakes the effect of combating the
eavesdropping on the secrecy outage probability. As expected,
the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing Ns,
which is due to the array gains brought by additional antennas.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secure communication in large
scale spectrum sharing network in the presence of multiple
non-colluding eavesdroppers. We employed the beamforming
and artificial noise generation at the SU transmitters to achieve
the secure transmission against those malicious eavesdroppers.
We obtained the exact expression for the average secrecy rate,
through which we observed the average secrecy rate wall.
We also derived the exact expression for the secrecy outage
probability. The impact of different system parameters on the
average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability was
demonstrated. It is shown that the optimal power allocation
factor that maximizes the average secrecy rate needs not to be
the equal power allocation. The results in this paper provide
valuable insights for the design of large scale spectrum sharing
networks.
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